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Observance of the 

One Hundred and Twenty-third Anniversary 

of the Evacuation of Philadelphia by 

the British Army. 



Fort Washington and the Encampment at White Marsh, 
November 2, 1777. 



An Address 

DELIVERED BEFORE THE SOCIETY BY THE PRESIDENT, 

RICHARD McCALL CADWALADER, 

at his Residence, 
"Stonedge," on the Skippack Pike, 

June 15, 1901. 



PRESS OF 

THE NEW ERA PRINTING COMPANY, 

LANCASTER, PA. 












V 



ADDRESS 

OF 

RICHARD McCALL CADWALADER, 

AT ** STONEDGE," 

June J5, I90J. 

J* 

Mr. Chairman and Fellozv Members of the Pennsylvania Society of 
Sons of the Revolution : 

In accordance with our usual custom to commemorate some 
historic event, you have come to the scene of the encampment at 
White Marsh and Fort Washington. Let me remind you how- 
ever that unlike other expeditions, you are on this occasion, on 
hallowed ground, literally surrounded by localities closely identi- 
fied with the active events of the War of the Revolution. 

Along here marched the militia, under General Potter to 
Militia Hill, and along this Skippack road, through these fields, 
the militia were supposed to be on guard at the time of the 
attempt to capture Lafayette at Barren Hill, just beyond the 
wood on the right. Directly in front is St. Thomas' Church, 
occupied by both armies, and where Gen. Wayne rallied the 
troops after the battle of Germantown. 

In the rear is Edge Hill, the scene of a fierce fight at the time 
of Howe's threatened attack on Fort Washington. To the left 
is Fort Washington, where a part of the army encamped, de- 
fended by a redout that can still be seen. Behind, higher up, is 
Camp Hill where the main army was stationed. Lower down in 
the valley is George Emlen's house, Washington's headquarters. 
In the rear are the Limekiln Pike and York roads along which 
the troops marched. Further to the left is Hatboro, then known 
as " Crooked Billet," from the sign of a tavern, where some 800 

3 



British troops attacked Gen. Lacey sent out by General Wash- 
ington while at Valley Forge, to stop marauding. 

Then further along is the Bethlehem Pike, the road to Beth- 
lehem and Easton, and near by the Three Tuns Tavern where 
Washington is said to have dined with his officers, on the march 
to Valley Forge. The descendants of the host to this day, 
celebrate the event by a dinner each year. Still further in the 
circle is the Foulke Mansion, made famous by Miss Sallie Wis- 
ter's letters, relating that the young ladies were obliged to flirt 
with the officers of both armies ; then the Drayton farm where 
some 10,000 men encamped at the time of the headquarters at 
the Morris house immediately adjoining. Here the court mar- 
tial sat at the request of Gen. Wayne, and a council of war dis- 
cussed an attack on Germantown. Continuing thus on, the 
Skippack Creek, Matsori's Ford, Swedes Ford, Plymouth and 
Barren Hill, completing the circle. 

It is therefore not only with pleasure, but with some pride 
that I welcome you to the White Marsh Valley. How it ever 
obtained that name was for a time seriously discussed. At first, 
White Marsh was called Farmerstown from Major Jasper 
Farmer, the first settler. Some say the name came from the 
white sand oozing from the ground. Rev. Mr. Millet, a former 
Rector of St. Thomas' Church, contended it was from a parish 
in England, but the parish has never been found, though the 
name appears in Virginia and North Carolina. Enthusiastic fol- 
lowers of Pastorius, who settled Germantown, claimed the name 
from "Whit mar sun" in Friesland, Holland. 

It is finally settled that the name came from the wide marsh 
along the Wissahickon, which, as the local historians are fond of 
saying, developed into the beautiful name of "White Marsh." 
(In 1 71 3 the Germans on the Skippack petitioned that a road be 
opened from Pennypacker's Mills to the wide marsh at Farmer's 
Mill.) 

Among numerous others, there are two Fort Washingtons of 
importance; the one on the Hudson erected by Col. Rufus 
Putnam, just above New York, to command the river, guard the 



5 

stores at Peekskill and prevent reinforcements to Canada, and 
this fort almost in front, to the left of St. Thomas' Church. 

I propose to make a brief address from Fort Washington on 
the Hudson to Fort Washington in the White Marsh Valley. 
The capture of Fort Washington on the Hudson was one of the 
worst blows of the whole War, and had the effect of changing 
the plans of both armies, resulting in the march to Philadelphia 
and the encampment at White Marsh. The campaign from the 
Hudson was one continuous campaign to Fort Washington here, 
ending with the retreat to Valley Forge. It also embraces the 
most critical period of Washington's military life, for he was 
never able to assert himself until the winter at Valley Forge. 
It is of special importance to us, because nearly all the troops 
were Pennsylvania regiments under Colonel Magaw. They were 
among the best in the service and well officered. 

You will remember that soon after Washington took command 
at Cambridge, he hastened to the troops investing Howe at Bos- 
ton after the battle at Bunker Hill. The Americans succeeded 
in fortifying Dorchester Heights, thus commanding the town. 
Howe evacuated Boston, and set sail for Halifax, as if to aid 
against Canada, but really to await reinforcements from his 
brother Admiral Howe. 

Washington conceived that he would make for New York to 
attack the centre of men and supplies. 

The American army withdrew to Long Island, and fortified 
the Heights of Brooklyn, to command New York. Howe re- 
turned, landing some 25,000 men at Staten Island. The Ameri- 
cans, 17,000 men, were outgeneraled and surrounded, although 
the fighting was fierce. In the midst of a dense fog, Washington 
withdrew his army, effecting a masterly retreat to New York, 
thence to White Plains where he awaited Howe's army, in a 
fortified camp. 

There was some criticism against Washington for the battle of 
Long Island, but the Declaration of Independence had but a 
few days before been declared, and Howe's reinforcements from 
Europe were a surprise. Washington established himself at 



White Plains, foiling Howe's attempt to get in his rear, fortified 
his position, expecting an attack. Howe followed. Military 
critics say that Howe could have destroyed the American army 
and should have attacked. Letters from officers confirm this : 
at least a hostile, well-disciplined army confronted the Americans 
who were depressed and discouraged. For some reason General 
Howe hesitated, probably hoping that he could still make terms, 
but it soon developed that he intended to take Fort Washington 
by assault. 

Fort Washington with Fort Constitution on the opposite side, 
and Fort Lee further towards Peekskill, with various contrivances 
blocked the Hudson River. It was supposed that it was a very 
strong position. The Pennsylvania Regiments under Cadwalader, 
Magaw and parts of Miles and Atlee's battalions comprised 
nearly the entire garrison, and were stretched out some two 
miles. Magaw was in command. Howe's vessels succeeded in 
passing up the river. Washington saw it was hopeless to remain, 
as his experience in the French and Indian War in Virginia had 
taught the danger of a chain of Forts with a weak force ; he pro- 
tested but was unheeded with the fatal result. The same thing 
happened here ; Congress insisted Fort Washington should be 
held. Washington had gone to West Point to arrange a fortified 
position there, intending to evacuate. Magaw was confident and 
Washington had yielded to Greene who was in command on the 
spot. Greene in the meantime had thrown in about 1,000 men, 
making the total about 3,000. By a vastly superior force, the 
Americans were driven from the field to the Fort. It was so 
small, and became so crowded they were unable to move and 
defend themselves ; surrender followed. Lord Howe returned 
some 2,800 men and officers besides a great deal of artillery. 
There was no such loss during the War. The number of pris- 
oners was so great that some were never exchanged. 

Discovering a letter from Colonel Lambert Cadwalader, who 
commanded his Regiment in the Fort to Col. Timothy Pickering, 
I give you its substance : 



Trenton, May 1822. 
Dear Sir, ..j 

I reed your letter of the 1 5th inst. and thank you for the 
information it contains. 

It is now more than Forty five years since the Affair of Fort 
Washington, and though it can scarcely be expected I should be 
able, after so long an interval, to afford you a full Narrative of 
all the Incidents that occur'd on the Day of the Attack, yet I 
have it in my power, in some Measure, to satisfy your inquiries. 
I shall however avail myself, in performing this Task, and to save 
Trouble, of a statement of this Nature, wh I made in the year 
181 1, at the Request of a Friend of mine, formerly a Captain in 
the 3d Pennsylvania Battalion wh I commanded in the War of 
the Revolution, who was writing a book entitled " Memoirs of a 
Life chiefly passed in Pennsylvania within the last Sixty years," 
in which he mentions the Attack on Fort Washington, and our 
Posts, on the Island of New York. 

My Statement commences on page 175 of that Work, and 
ends in page 1 80, with my Arrival at the Fort ; exclusively of 
which I furnished not a single Sentence published in the Book. 
I however recommend to your notice, a Paragraph of the Author, 
in his Book pages 188, 189, in which he gives the following ex- 
tract from Genl Washington's Letter to Congress. 

" I sent a billet to Col. Magaw directing him to hold out, and 
I would endeavor in the Evening to bring off the Garrison, if the 
Fortress could not be maintained, as I did not expect it could, 
the Enemy being possessed of the adjacent Ground." When I 
arrived at the Fort, I found the British had succeeded, in their 
several Attacks, and were in possession of all the Ground, except 
that in which the Fort stood. That they should have been pos- 
sessed of all the adjacent Ground with the Force they employed, 
could not well be wondered at, when it is known, 

1 st That the Post on the Rear of Mount Washington was at- 
tacked by 3000 Hessians, against Col Rawlin's single Regiment 
of Riflemen. 



2d That the Post at the Point on Haarlem River, opposite to 
Fort Washington, was assailed by the British Guards & Light 
Infantry, and defended by a raw Regiment of Militia. 

3d. That at Roger Morris's House not a Man was posted for 
Defence, and when Six or Seven Hundred Highlanders ap- 
proached the Shore, the only opposition they encountered was by 
the Detachment of about 1 50 Men from the lower Line wh they 
could not well spare. 

4th. That the attack on the lower Line, extending across the 
Island of New York, was by 1600 British Troops against 650 
Men ; the Number of Men left after the Detachment of 1 50 Men 
was sent to Roger Morris's House. 

The Lower Line required 3000 Men for an efficient Defence. 
The Assailants in the whole, were estimated at 7000, supported 
by the British Army. 

The Fort and the extent of the Ground, including the Flanks 
on the Haarlem and North Rivers, required at least 8000 men. 
The Fort I always considered as an open Field Fort — con- 
structed of earth, without Casemates or even Shelter — (the Can- 
non Iron six Pounders) without any qualification or Character, 
which could possibly be construed into a Fortress capable of 
standing a Siege, against a regular Army, furnished with Artil- 
lery. 

Before I left the Fort, many weeks previous to the Attack, to 
take charge of the lower Line and the adjacent Ground, I had a 
Conversation with the commanding Officer on the Island, in 
which I most forcibly inculcated the necessity of instantly at- 
tending to the full Supply of Water, Ammunition and Provisions 
and everything requisite for the Defence of the Fort, and also 
proposed to him to form a Work which I conceived would be of 
great importance in flanking the Enemy should they attempt to 
ascend the Hill in Rear of Mount Washington — the Spot they 
actually selected for the Attack ; all of which he cordially ap- 
proved. 

General Washington's idea of the Incompetency of the Fort 
to make a serious Defence, is efficiently evinced in his Billet to 



Col. Magaw ; and I may add the Sentiment entertained by Genl 
Lee, who in a Conversation he had with me, reprobated the 
Measure of keeping the Garrison on New York Island ; and 
said when he reed the Intelligence of the unfortunate event, he 
was so excited, that he tore the Hair out of his Head. 

I have thus, with Candour and Impartiality given you the best 
Information in my Power, and if the Facts I have disclosed 
should bear hard upon the Advisers and Abbettors, of the fatal 
Measure of keeping the Troops on the Island, after General 
Washington had crossed to the West side of the North River, 
and whilst General Howe was marching his Army down to King's 
Bridge, I would not take a Feather from the weight which must 
fall on their heads, however dignified, or however high they may 
have ranked in the Army. ****** 

Few remain who can look so far back as we can, and upon 
Scenes more important to our Country. 

With great Regard & Esteem 

I remain, Dear Sir, 

Your Obedt Servt 
Lamb* Cadwalader. 
Col. Timothy Pickering. 

Now the point I wish to make is this, the capture of Fort 
Washington on the Hudson changed the whole campaign of 
both armies, and led to movements resulting in the encampment 
at White Marsh after the Battle of Germantown. From the Hud- 
son to Fort Washington was one continuous campaign, ending 
with the retreat to Valley Forge. 

Washington immediately retreated to the Jerseys, throwing a 
body of troops between the enemy and the Delaware, to protect 
Philadelphia. He cautioned Gen. Charles Lee to be on the alert, 
but Lee thought he could take care of himself, exclaiming, " Oh ! 
General, how could you be persuaded by those whose judgment 
was inferior to your own?" This was the first echo of what 
afterwards became the "Conway Cabal," for Lee and Gates 



IO 

thought Washington's star was waning, and Col. Reed, of Wash- 
ington's staff, writes to Lee : " We are in an awful and alarming 
situation. I think yourself or some one should go to Congress 
and form plans of a new army." The correspondence between 
Washington and Lee, and Lee and Gates is one of the extra- 
ordinary occurrences of the whole War. 

Lee disagreed with Washington as to the designs of the enemy 
against Philadelphia, and meditated an attack in the rear which 
he thought would redound to his own reputation. He replies 
to Reed that as soon as he carried out his own views, he would 
fly to the aid of the Commander-in-chief, as he really thought 
the Commander-in-chief could do better with him than without 
him. 

Washington had been closely followed by the enemy and 
lingered at Brunswick in the hope of reinforcements. His men 
were dispirited by their misfortunes, and the loss of baggage. 
Gen. Heath, who had been ordered forward and was withheld by 
Lee, writes that " Gen. Lee's conduct is so extraordinary that one 
is at a loss to account for it." Lee still delaying, Washington 
writes, " Do come on ! Your arrival may be the means of pre- 
serving a city whose loss must prove of the most fatal conse- 
quence to the cause of America." 

Putnam was detached to take command of Philadelphia and 
put it in a state of defense. Congress adjourned to Baltimore. 
Washington had then about 5,000 men ; 1,000 N. J. Militia, 
1,500 Militia from Philadelphia and 500 German Yeomanry from 
Pennsylvania. Gates, however, he was informed, could come 
with seven Regiments, and these, with the troops from Lee, would 
enable him to strike a blow. Lee then at Morristown, with 
4,000 men, writes to Washington, " I cannot persuade myself 
that Philadelphia is the object at present. Cannot I do more 
service by attacking their rear? " 

Washington replies, " Philadelphia, beyond all question, is the 
object of the enemy's movements, and nothing less than our ut- 
most exertions will prevent Gen. Howe from possessing it. The 
force I have is weak and utterly incompetent. I must therefore 



1 1 

entreat you to push on with every possible succor you can bring." 
Lee heard that Gates had arrived at Peekskill, and writes to 
Heath to forward three Regiments to Morristown, adding, " I 
am in hopes of recapturing the province. It was really in the 
hands of the enemy before my arrival." 

On the i ith of December he writes to Washington he should 
march to the ferry above Burlington. Washington replies, " I 
am surprised that you should be in doubt as to which route to 
take. I have so frequently mentioned our situation and the 
necessity of your aid, that it is painful to me to add a word on 
the subject. Congress has directed that Philadelphia be de- 
fended to the last extremity. The fatal consequences that must 
attend its loss are but too obvious to everyone. Your arrival 
may be the means of saving it." 

Lee finally decamped from Morristown, but marched only 
about 8 miles to a small town. Leaving General Sullivan in 
command of the troops, he took up his quarters at a tavern at Bas- 
kenridge some miles distant. As the British were 20 miles away 
he took only a small guard. He had ordered General Sullivan 
to march to Pluckamin, off the route he was ordered to take, in- 
dicating an attack on the British at Brunswick. He writes to 
Gates, " The ingenious manoeuvre of Fort Washington has com- 
pletely unhinged the goodly fabric we have been building. 
There never was so damned a stroke ; entre nous ! a certain 
great man is damnably deficient ! He has thrown me into a sit- 
uation where I have my choice of difficulties. If I stay in this 
province I risk myself and army, if I do not stay, the province 
is lost forever. As to what relates to yourself, if you think you 
can be in time to aid the General, by all means go. You will at 
least save your army." Almost at that moment, Colonel Har- 
court and his dragoons appeared before the house, and very for- 
tunately General Lee was captured, placed on a horse bare- 
headed, in slippers and blanket coat, and carried to Bruns- 
wick. 

General Sullivan, assuming command, changed his route and 
joined Washington. The British supposed they had captured 



12 

the most scientific of the American generals, who had neglected 
the first principle of war, " Keep a united army." 

Severe words were spoken against Gen. Lee and serious accusa- 
tion made, somewhat modified by the harsh treatment he ingeni- 
ously complained of. Washington writes, " This is an additional 
misfortune, and the most vexatious as it was from his own folly 
and imprudence." Washington had previously expressed faith 
in Lee, but added, " He is fickle, capricious and ambitious." 

A party seems about this time to have sprung up in Congress 
for the purpose of superseding Washington. If Lee had suc- 
ceeded in his schemes he would probably have been made Com- 
mander-in-chief. 

An intercepted letter convinced Washington that Howe was 
only waiting for the River to freeze to commence active opera- 
tions. Being reinforced by Sullivan and Gates, Washington de- 
termined on the aggressive. He offered a command to Gates to 
cooperate from Bristol, but Gates declined and set out for Phila- 
delphia. He was urged to confer with Colonel Reed and General 
John Cadwalader at Bristol. This he seems to have avoided, and 
told Wilkinson, one of his staff, that he should suggest to Con- 
gress that instead of attempting to stop Howe at the Delaware, 
we ought to retire to the South of the Susquehanna and form a 
new army there. In spite of all these complications, however, 
Washington on that Christmas night crossed the Delaware with 
about 2,400 men and won the Battle of Trenton, taking 1,000 
prisoners, of whom 32 were officers. The other divisions not 
joining, his position was extremely hazardous, so he recrossed 
the river. The time of many men was about to expire. This 
was the turning point of the Revolution. The men were per- 
suaded to serve six months longer, but there was no money. 
Washington writes to Robert Morris : " If you could possibly 
collect ;£ioo or .£1 50 it would be of service." Morris was at his 
wits end, but finally a wealthy Quaker loaned the money. Just 
think of it ! $750 ! Fiske says $50,000 were sent. 

The ice impeded crossing, thus enabling Howe to concentrate 
his forces at Princeton. Cornwallis, who had obtained leave of 



13 

absence, was hastily recalled. He assumed command and 
entered Trenton. The two hostile armies encamped on the two 
sides of the Assanpink Creek. Cornwallis was urged to attack 
that night, but feeling sure of the game, said he would " bag the 
fox in the morning." Leaving his fires burning, Washington 
slipped away in the night. Cornwallis was completely outgener- 
alled, for Washington pushed on for the British stores at Bruns- 
wick. Meeting a force of the enemy, possibly two regiments, he 
was delayed to fight the battle of Princeton. Cornwallis fol- 
lowed ; thus began the race to Brunswick. 

To General Putnam at Philadelphia, Washington writes : "I am 
in hopes of driving the enemy from the Jerseys." 

To General Heath, at the Highlands, he writes : " The enemy 
are in great confusion," and directs him to move towards New 
York while he followed to Morristown. 

In the meantime Cornwallis collected his troops at Brunswick 
and Amboy, to have communication by water with New York, 
presenting, as Hamilton said, the extraordinary spectacle of a 
powerful army straitened within narrow limits, and never permitted 
to transgress those limits with impunity. It was a triumphant 
close to the most critical period of the war, as Irving says, gain- 
ing for Washington from statesmen and generals in Europe, the 
name of the American Fabius. Cornwallis, at the surrender of 
Yorktown, expressing his admiration, said : "After all, your Ex- 
cellency's operations in New Jersey were such that nothing could 
surpass them." 

The British officers wrote that the rebels were fleeing in con- 
fusion, but Thomas Paine, who had accompanied the army, says : 
" With a handful of men we continued an orderly retreat four 
hundred miles, saving baggage, ammunition, field pieces, stores 
and crossing four rivers. None can say that our retreat was 
precipitate for we were three weeks in performing it, that the 
country might have time to come in. Twice we marched back 
to meet the enemy." 

Howe was in winter quarters in New York ; his troops loosely 
cantoned about the Jerseys from the Delaware to New Bruns- 
wick. 



14 

The British generals had been outgeneraled, defeated and 
held in check by Washington, encamped on the Heights of 
Morristown. Various strategic movements took place without 
particular change in position. Elias Boudinot tells of the spy 
who had been sent by Howe to Washington's headquarters. 
Being deceived by false returns he reported to Howe who de- 
cided it would be imprudent to attack. (" Life and Letters of 
Elias Boudinot.") 

There was still fear that Howe might ascend the Hudson and 
join Burgoyne, as he should have done, or make an attack upon 
New England in accordance with his original plan, yet the fitting 
out of the fleet looked like an attack on Philadelphia. Finally 
when the fleet was seen in the capes of the Delaware, Washing- 
ton marched to Germantown by this York road, camping at 
Neshaminy Falls near Hartsville. 

Fiske, in his American Revolution, page 307, says : Howe's 
expedition by sea was in consequence of General Lee's advice. 
This proved his ruin, as his instructions were to get back in time 
to aid Burgoyne. Fiske also adds that eighty years after the 
war a paper was found, dated March 29th, 1777, marked " Mr. 
Lee's plan " thus proving that Lee's subsequent behavior on the 
field of Monmouth was rank treason. 

Spending some days at Stenton, the Logan family homestead, 
after conference at Philadelphia, Washington hastened to Chester. 
In the meantime precaution was taken to defend the approaches 
by the river. Some supposed that Charleston would be the ob- 
jective point, and at a council of war it was proposed to march 
toward the Hudson and attack New York, as it could hardly be 
believed that Howe would desert Burgoyne. As there was 
much disaffection at Philadelphia, Washington marched his army 
through the city to Front and Walnut streets, making all the 
display possible, continuing on to Wilmington at the confluence 
of Christiana Creek and the Brandywine, where he set up his 
headquarters. 

Howe finally landed at the head of Elk on Chesapeake Bay, 
seventy miles from Philadelphia, hoping to find friends in the 
lower counties. 



i5 

The divisions of Generals Greene and Stephens were ordered 
from Wilmington. Sullivan arrived with 3,000 men. Washing- 
ton had made up his mind to a battle in the open field. He had 
about 15,000 men, only 11,000 of whom were effective. The 
British had 18,000, but only 15,000 in action. Cornwallis 
gained the rear and Sullivan was ordered to oppose him, while 
Wayne kept Knyphausen at bay at the Ford. Sullivan was 
forced to give way. Knyphausen tried to force his way across 
the Ford. Wayne, and Proctor's artillery opposed him. Greene 
was summoned to support the right wing. The British were 
victorious and we were driven from the field. Wayne retired to 
the Chester Road. The Commander-in-chief arriving with 
Greene, the whole army took position behind Chester for the 
night. The scene of this battle deciding the fate of Philadelphia 
was 28 miles from Philadelphia. Congress fled to Lancaster 
and afterward to Yorktown. Howe did not push the pursuit. 
Lafayette says had he done so and marched directly to Darby, 
the American army would have been destroyed. 

Washington taking advantage of Howe's inactivity, passed 
through Darby on the 1 2th, across the Schuylkill to Germantown 
within a short distance of Philadelphia, encamping at Hill's house 
near the present Queen Lane reservoir. Leaving Armstrong with 
some Pennsylvania militia to guard Philadelphia, he recrossed 
the Schuylkill and advanced toward the Lancaster road with the 
intention of turning Howe's left flank. Howe made a similar 
disposition to outflank him. The two armies came in sight of 
each other at the Warren Tavern, 23 miles from Philadelphia, but 
were prevented by a violent storm from engaging. Through the 
rain and mire, they marched to Yellow Springs and thence to War- 
wick Furnace. Detaching Wayne to get in the rear, in touch 
with General Smallwood of the Maryland Militia, and watch for 
Howe's baggage and hospital trains, Washington crossed at 
Parker's Ford and took position. Wayne got to Tredyffrin near 
Paoli and urged Washington to come on to attack. But the 
country being full of disaffected persons, Howe received infor- 
mation and detached General Gray to surprise Wayne. Wayne 



i6 

ordered his men to sleep on their arms. Col. Hampton, the 
second in command, received the attack, resulting in the massacre 
of Paoli. Wayne retreated, rallied his troops and made a stand. 
The British retired with 70 or 80 prisoners and eight baggage 
wagons. Smallwood's men seeing the victors approaching, 
fled in a panic. Having disposed of Wayne, Howe made a 
rapid march up the Schuylkill on the road to Reading, as if to 
capture the stores ; this was a feint. 

Washington followed to Pottsgrove, 30 miles from Philadel- 
phia. Howe succeeded in crossing at Valley Forge, and Gor- 
don's Ford (Phcenixville), and moving southward, encamping at 
Stony Creek, Norristown, for the night, slipped into Philadel- 
phia by Germantown, a march of 20, some say 30, days. 

Washington then collected his force, about 8,000 and 3,000 
militia, marched to Pottsgrove, Pennypacker's Mills, to Skippack 
Creek, camping at Mecthacton Hills, 14 miles from Germantown. 

About this time Washington heard of the surrender of Bur- 
goyne to Gates, who had reported directly to Congress, then sit- 
ting at Yorktown, ignoring his Commander-in-chief, taking the 
credit of Schuyler's sagacity, Washington's activity in detaining 
Howe, and Arnold's bravery. 

It was decided to move to Blue Bell and the Morris House. 
Hoping that the defence of the Delaware would resist the fleet 
under Admiral Howe, the American army could invest by land, 
and thus as Franklin had said, Philadelphia has taken General 
Howe instead of Howe taking Philadelphia. 

Intercepted letters giving information that Howe had detached 
some of his force to the Jerseys, to aid in clearing the River 
Delaware, Washington determined to attack the British camp at 
Germantown. The British encampment extended across the vil- 
lage of Germantown at right angles with the main road. From 
the Skippack Creek, 14 miles, the march began down the Skip- 
pack road, to approach by four routes, that all should arrive at 
the same time. 

The divisions of Sullivan and Wayne, flanked by Conway's 
Brigade, were to enter the town by a road leading to the enemy's 



i7 

centre, while Armstrong with the Pennsylvania Militia were to 
take the road on the right near the Schuylkill and gain their left/ 

The divisions of Greene and Stephens flanked by McDougal's 
Brigade were to, make a circuit on the American left by the Lime- 
kiln Pike, and attack the British right wing, while the Maryland 
and Jersey Militia under Smallwood were to march down by a 
road still further to the left, Old York Road, and fall upon their 
right flank and rear. The plan was well concerted and the sur- 
prise complete. Washington accompanied the right wing, emerg- 
ing from the woods at Chestnut Hill. The morning was dark, 
and there was a heavy fog. 

The patrol led by Capt. Allen McLane, attacked the soldiers 
stationed as pickets, attached to a battalion forming at Mount 
Airy. Wayne led the attack with light infantry. He says they 
broke at first, but soon formed, and a well-directed fire followed 
on both sides. The British again gave way, but returned. Sulli- 
van's division formed on the west of the road and joined in the 
attack. The rest were too far off. The enemy broke, leaving 
their artillery, and were hotly pursued by Wayne. " Our men 
pushed on with the bayonet," says Wayne, "remembering Paoli, 
Sept. 20th." Officers tried to restrain them and a terrible 
melee occurred. The fog, together with the smoke from the 
guns made it as dark as night. The whole force of the enemy 
were driven from the ground, leaving the tents standing, and all 
the baggage. Col. Musgrave threw himself with some com- 
panies of the 40th British Regiment, into Chew's house. The 
main body passed on, pursued by Wayne. 

As the rest of this division came up to join in the pursuit, Mus- 
grave opened fire from the upper windows of Chew's house. This 
halted them ; some were for pushing on, but General Knox ob- 
jected, on the old military maxim, " never leave a garrisoned fort 
in the rear." Lieutenant Smith, demanding surrender, with a 
flag of truce, was mortally wounded. The artillery was too light, 
and an attempt to fire the house failed. At length a regiment 
was left, and the rest passed on. This delay was fatal though 
only half an hour. The divisions could not be united. The fog 



and the smoke rendered all obscure at 30 yards. They knew 
nothing of their position ; the original plan was only carried out 
in the centre ; the flanks were not molested. 

Sullivan, however, reinforced by the North Carolina Brigade, 
pushed on a mile beyond Chew's house, when the left wing of 
the enemy gave way before him. Greene and Stephens having 
made a circuit, were late, and became separated by reason of 
Stephens's division stopping to relieve the force at Chew's house. 
Greene pushed on to the market place, driving the enemy and 
taking a number of prisoners. The enemy began to waver ; 
Smallwood and the New Jersey and Maryland troops were just 
showing themselves on the right flank of the enemy, and our 
troops seemed on the point of carrying the day, when a singu- 
lar panic seized our army. Wayne's division having pursued 
three miles, alarmed by an approach of a body of American 
troops on their left, which they mistook for the enemy, fell back 
in spite of their officers. Falling upon Stephens's division, they 
threw them into a panic, thinking they were the enemy, thus all 
was in confusion, and our army fled from their own victory, pur- 
sued by light horse from Philadelphia. The retreat met with 
less loss than might have been expected, the Americans carrying 
their guns and making a running fight. Wayne, in the mean- 
time, turned his cannon from the Church hill and brought the 
enemy to a stand. Then the retreat continued all day, to the 
Perkiomen Creek, 20 miles. 

Sullivan writes that Washington greatly exposed himself, and 
yielded to his entreaties to retire, but returned. 

Washington writes to Congress : " Every account confirms 
the opinion I first entertained, that our troops retreated on the 
instant when victory was declared. The tumult and discord and 
even despair which it seemed had taken place in the British army 
was scarcely to be paralleled, and it is said, so thoroughly did 
the idea of retreat prevail that Chester had been fixed for their 
rendezvous. I can discover no other cause for not improving 
this happy opportunity than the extreme haziness of the 
weather." 



19 

So, also, Capt. Heath, of Virginia, writes : "What makes this 
inglorious flight more galling to us was that we knew the enemy 
had ordered a retreat or rendezvous at Chester. And that 2000 
Hessians had actually crossed the Schuylkill ; that the Tories 
were in intense distress and moving from the city: that our 
prisoners confined in the new jail made it ring with shouts of joy ; 
that we passed, on pursuing, over 20 pieces of cannon, their tents 
standing filled with the choicest baggage ; in fine, everything was 
as we could have wished, when the above flight took place." 

Wayne writes : " Fortune smiled upon us for full three hours. 
The enemy were broken, dispersed, flying in all quarters ; we were 
in possession of their whole encampment, together with all their 
artillery. A windmill attack was made upon a house, into which 
six light companies had thrown themselves, to avoid our bayo- 
nets. Our troops were deceived by this attack ; thinking it some- 
thing formidable, they fell back. The enemy believing it to be a 
retreat, followed ; confusion ensued, and we ran away from the 
arms of victory open to us." 

The plan of attack was too widely extended for concert, and 
too complicated for precise cooperation, and the march had to be 
conducted in the night and with a large portion of undisciplined 
militia, and yet a bewildering fog alone appeared to have pre- 
vented its complete success. 

Irving says, however, that the impression made by the audacity 
of this attack attempted upon Germantown, was greater, we are 
told, than that caused by any single incident of the War, after 
Lexington and Bunker Hill. 

A British military historian observes: "In this action the 
Americans acted upon the offensive and though repulsed with 
loss, showed themselves a formidable adversary, capable of charg- 
ing with resolution, and retreating in good order." 

The army moved from Perkiomen to the old camping ground 
at Pennypacker's Mills. Washington was reinforced by some 
troops from Peekskill, no longer needed on the Hudson. To be 
nearer to Philadelphia he moved to the Blue Bell tavern, and 
encamped at Drayton's woods, with headquarters at the Morris 



20 

house. It was here that Lafayette joined him and a council of 
war was held ; also a court martial at the request of Wayne, to 
investigate the Paoli affair. It was important to watch Howe, as 
well as to hem him in at Philadelphia, and cut off supplies. 

The army moved to White Marsh. The main army encamped 
on the hill just beyond Fort Washington, called Camp Hill, for- 
merly the property of John Fell, now Mrs. Alexander Van Rens- 
selaer's. Washington's headquarters were established just below, 
in the house owned by George Emlen, a prominent Quaker mer- 
chant. The left wing occupied Fort Washington, where a strong 
redoubt was erected to command the road leading to German- 
town and Philadelphia. The Militia under General Potter, oc- 
cupied this hill to the right. 

The country was thickly wooded, with the Sandy Run in the 
rear of Fort Washington and the Wissahickon running along the 
side, with trees leveled in front, their tops pointed outward, made 
a strong position. 

Gates was pressed to send reinforcements, especially Morgan's 
men. He delayed, finally they and other troops arrived. The 
delay was embarrassing as the enemy were making attempts on 
Fort Mercer and Fort Mifflin on the Delaware. Howe con- 
structed batteries and invested by land and water, but Washington 
could not relinquish his position as it would leave the stores at 
Easton, Bethlehem and Allentown exposed. General Varnum 
was stationed at Red Bank. 

Howe attacked Fort Mifflin and the garrison was compelled to 
retreat to Red Bank. Finally the British fleet was successful in 
ascending the river, and the Americans were driven from their 
position. Had Gates obeyed orders and sent reinforcements, 
we might have stood our ground. 

Washington's position here at Fort Washington was very 
strong ; the British delayed action until they had completed 
some defences along the Schuylkill, and took extraordinary pre- 
caution in case of defeat. 

On the fourth of December, Capt. Allen McLane brought 
news to Washington's headquarters that an attack was to be 



21 

made that night. About three, the alarm guns announced the 
approach of the enemy ; they advanced as day broke and en- 
camped at Chestnut Hill, three miles from the right wing. Brig- 
adier General Irvine was sent with 600 Pennsylvania Militia to 
skirmish. He met a force coming from Flourtown at the foot of 
the hill below the church. His men gave way and he was taken 
prisoner. In the night the British moved northward, approaching 
within a mile of the encampment, the valley and the stream of 
Sandy Run intervening ; there on the edge of the hill they re- 
mained all day, having formed a line from our right to the 
extremity of our left upon the long height opposite to ours in the 
wood, fully three miles in extent directly in front of the American 
camp. At one o'clock in the morning they inclined still further 
to the left, indicating a general attack if Washington could be 
induced to leave his stronghold. 

To check the plundering of the farmers in the vicinity of Edge 
Hill, Morgan and his corps, supported by Potter's brigade and Col. 
Gist's Maryland Militia, were sent forward. A severe fight took 
place ; the British were obliged to concentrate their forces. The 
militia then fell back, as it was determined that no general en- 
gagement should take place unless they (z. e., the British) should 
attack Washington in position. 

In this advance the British had secured a higher and more 
commanding position ; Washington felt that an attack was in- 
tended. At 12 o'clock that night, 12 regiments paraded before 
Washington's headquarters under Sullivan and Wayne, when 
news came that the enemy had retreated to Philadelphia. Wash- 
ington writes to Congress : "I detached light troops to fall upon 
them, but they were not able to come up with them. I sincerely 
wish they had made the attack, as the issue, in all probability, 
from the disposition of our troops, and the strong position of our 
camp, would have been fortunate and happy." 

The British Army appear to have marched by the Church 
road, next by the Limekiln road, and lastly by the Susquehanna 
Street road, and thence down the old York road, through Jen- 
kintown, Shoemaker's Town and Rising Sun. Washington writes 



22 

further he was doubtful of the enemy's loss ; one account was 
500 men killed and wounded, but this was doubtless exagger- 
ated. Graham, in his life of General Morgan, says 350 killed 
and wounded, but adds that the rifle corps suffered severely. 

Washington says 27 men killed in Morgan's corps besides 
Major Morris, a valuable officer, wounded. Christopher Marshall 
in his diary states that General Howe had returned on the evening 
of the 8th, leaving behind 200 men, to the great astonishment of 
the citizens. Major Simcoe of the Queen's Rangers says the > 

rebels lost about 100 men and the King's troops a little more. 
This would show that the struggle had been a sharp one. Howe 
must have had nearly three fourths of his whole army. In the 
retreat, and in the four days' plundering, the British inflicted 
severe loss upon the inhabitants below Chestnut Hill, burning 
houses and seizing everything at hand, while the Hessians com- 
mitted many outrages. 

It has always been a matter of surprise that the British did not 
attack the rear, where they could have cut off Washington from 
his baggage and provisions. 

In this connection we should not omit the story of Lydia 
Darrah, who, it was claimed, gave the information of the attack 
by Howe. This has lately become a burning question. The 
Daughters of the American Revolution have threatened to be- 
come excited. A writer says if Washington was the father of his 
country Lydia Darrah was the mother, etc. William Darrah 
and his wife occupied the house where Major Andre, the British 
Adjutant General, had established himself in Philadelphia. She 
overheard the arrangements, and feigning sleep, arose to 
secure the doors as the officers departed. In the morning 
she informed the family that she must go to Frankford for 
some flour, stopping at the British headquarters to obtain a 
pass. Leaving her bag at Frankford she continued five miles 
through the snow to the American outposts. Falling in with 
Captain John Craig of the Light Horse, sent by Washington to 
gather information of the movements of the enemy, she disclosed 
her secret. Capt. Craig conducted her to a house nearby and has- 



LcfC. 



23 

tened to Washington's headquarters with the news. When the 
British Army returned to Philadelphia, the Adjutant General, 
Andre, entered the house and inquired if any of her family were 
up the night before. She replied that all had retired at 8 p. m. 
Andre replied : " It is very strange how Gen. Washington could 
have obtained the information of our attack. I knew you were 
asleep Lydia, for I rapped three times before you awakened, yet 
it is certain we were betrayed. We found Washington prepared 
at every point to receive us, and we were obliged to march back to 
the city like a parcel of fools." 

In one of the historical sketches published by the Montgomery 
County Historical Society, the author remarks, " Shame on the 
American people that this brave woman should have gone to her 
grave without reward, while ' Captain Molly ' [Pitcher] of Mon- 
mouth was rewarded. By the recommendation of Washington, 
her name was placed on the list of half-pay officers for life, and 
she also had conferred upon her the commission of sergeant. The 
action of Mrs. Darrah was of so much more importance to the 
army that we fail to understand why it should have passed un- 
recognized by the Government." Watson says General Armstrong 
and Colonel Clark gave the information Nov. 29, and Dec. 1 and 3. 

Irving, in his life of Washington, tells us that Capt. Allen 
McLane gave Washington this information, and Washington him- 
self writes to Congress : " From a variety of intelligence received, 
I had reason to believe that General Howe intended to give 
us a general action." In the 1st volume of "The Life and Let- 
ters of Elias Boudinot," page 68, we find he writes : 

"In the autumn of 1777 the American army lay some time 
at Whitemarsh. I was then commissary-general of prisoners 
and managed the intelligence of the army. I was reconnoitering 
along the lines near the city of Philadelphia. I dined at a small 
post at the Rising Sun, about three miles from the city. After 
dinner a little, poor-looking, insignificant old woman came in and 
solicited leave to go into the country to buy some flour. While 
we were asking some questions she walked up to me and put into 
my hands a dirty old needlebook with various small pockets in 



2 4 

it. Surprised at this, I told her she should return and she should 
have an answer. On opening the needlebook I could not find 
anything till I got to the last pocket, where I found a piece of 
paper rolled into the form of a pipe shank. On unrolling it I 
found information that General Howe was coming out the next 
morning with 5,000 men, 13 pieces of cannon, baggage wagons 
and 1 1 boats on wagon wheels. On comparing this with other 
information I found it true, and immediately rode first to head- 
quarters. According to my usual custom, and agreeable to 
orders received from General Washington, I first related to him 
the naked facts without comment or opinion. He received it 
with much thoughtfulness. I then gave him my opinion, that 
General Howe's design was to cross the Delaware under pretense 
of going to New York, then in the night to recross the Dela- 
ware above Bristol and come suddenly on our rear, where we 
were totally unguarded, and cut off our baggage, if not the 
whole army. He heard it without a single observation, being 
deep in thought. I repeated my observations. He still was 
silent. Supposing myself unattended to I earnestly repeated my 
opinion with urging him to order a few redoubts thrown up in 
our rear, as it was growing late. The general answered me, 
' Mr. Boudinot, the enemy have no business in our rear ; the boats 
are designed to deceive us. To-morrow morning by daylight 
you will find them coming down such a byroad on our left.' 
Then calling an aide-de-camp, ordered a line thrown up 
along our whole front at the foot of the hill. As I was 
quartered on that very byroad with six or eight other officers, 
a mile in front of our army and no picket advanced in front of us, 
his opinion made a deep impression upon me, though I thought 
the general under a manifest mistake. I returned to my quarters, 
first obtaining a picket to be put on that road in advance. 
When I got home the officers were informed of the news and my 
opinion that we should lose our baggage at least the next morn- 
ing. That our general was at least out in his judgment, but 
repeated his last words, proposed it as a matter of prudence to 
have our horses saddled and the servants ordered to have them 



25 

at the door on the first alarm gun being fired. About 3 o'clock 
in the morning we were aroused by the alarm guns ; we imme- 
diately mounted. By sunrise the British were in possession of 
our quarters down the byroad mentioned by General Washington. 
I then said I never would set up my judgment against his. The 
enemy remained several days encamped on Chestnut Hill and 
General Washington opposite to him. On the evening of the 
second or third day General Washington was informed of some 
very harsh and severe speeches made by a committee from con- 
gress, of which Robert Morris was one, relative to General 
Washington for not attacking the British and putting an end to 
the war at once, and declaring that if he did not do it further op- 
position to the British was vain, etc. The fact was that both 
parties were so strongly covered that the assailant in all prob- 
ability would have been beaten and the essential interests of 
America required that the Americans should gain the battle. 
However General Washington being exceedingly hurt with these 
observations and hard speeches determined at all events to hazard 
an attack and let the committee abide the consequences. Ac- 
cordingly he detached General Wayne with his brigade to ad- 
vance on the enemy and into the valley between the two armies 
and near the foot of Chestnut Hill, to be ready in the morning. 
Another brigade was advanced part of the way towards him. 

"A spy, who was in our camp immediately on Wayne's mov- 
ing carried the intelligence to the British general. A skirmish was 
had in the day and one of our militia generals was wounded and 
taken prisoner. He was put into a room adjoining one in which 
a British aide-de-camp lodged. He overheard an officer come in 
and tell him that the Rebels were advancing to make an attack 
next morning and that their retreat was ordered by the British 
general. When the American troops began their movement next 
morning at the dawn of day not a British soldier was to be seen. 
The light horse pursued and came up and harassed the rear of 
the British a few miles from Philadelphia. Thus the defeat of 
the American army was again providentially prevented, for we 
were by no means equal to the attack, as the British were so 



26 

strongly formed and our army made up of undisciplined men." 
From this it would appear that Lydia Darrah really did give 
information and the story is true ; but it was not to her alone the 
credit was due, which may have made it impossible to do full 
justice to her. 

While in camp here, Washington learned of the activity of the 
cabal against him. It seems that on the 17th of October, 1777 
he wrote to Richard Henry Lee, then in Congress, protesting 
against the promotion of Gen. Conway to the rank of Major- 
General, which threw Conway into the faction then forming. 
He became so active that the faction acquired the name of " Con- 
way's Cabal." The object seemed to be to depreciate Washing- 
ton's military character in comparison with that of Gates, who 
had achieved the surrender of Burgoyne by the plans of Wash- 
ington and Schuyler, and the bravery of Arnold. The corres- 
pondence between Conway and Gates, and also of James Lovell, 
member of Congress from Massachusetts, was of extraordinary 
character, on a parallel with that of General Charles Lee. 

Washington writes Conway — Sir : A letter which I received 
last night contained the following paragraph — in a letter from 
General Conway to General Gates he says . . . Heaven 
has determined to save your country, or a weak general and bad 
Counsellors would have ruined it. I am sir your humble servant, 

" George Washington." 



James Lovell writes to Gates : " You have saved our Northern 
Hemisphere ; and in spite of consummate and repeated blundering, 
you have changed the condition of the Southern campaign, on 
the part of the enemy from offensive to defensive. . . . The 
campaign here must soon close ; if our troops are obliged to re- 
tire to Lancaster, Reading, Bethlehem, etc. for winter quarters, 
and the country below is laid open to the enemy's flying parties, 
great and very general will be the murmur — so great, so general, 
that nothing inferior to a commander-in-chief will be able to re- 
sist the mighty torrent of public clamor and public vengeance. 



27 

We have had a noble army melted down by ill-judged marches, 
marches that disgrace the authors and directors, and which have 
occasioned the severest and most just sarcasm and contempt of 
our enemies. 

" How much are you to be envied my dear general ! How 
different your conduct and your fortune ! 

"A letter from Col. Mifflin, received at the writing of the last 
paragraph, gives me the disagreeable intelligence of the loss of 
our fort on the Delaware. You must know the consequences — 
loss of the river boats, galleys, ships of war, etc : good winter 
quarters to the enemy, and a general retreat, or ill-judged, blind 
attempt on our part to save a gone character. 

" Conway, Spotswood, Conner, Ross and Mifflin resigned, and 
many other brave and good officers are preparing their letters to 
Congress on the same subject. In short this army will be totally 
lost, unless you come down and collect the virtuous band who 
wish to fight under your banner, and with their aid save the 
Southern Hemisphere. Prepare yourself for a jaunt to this place 
— Congress must send for you." 

Finally the intrigues of the cabal were exposed resulting in 
the duel of Conway and the complete extinction of the whole 
party, during the encampment at Valley Forge. Lafayette 
writes that Lee would have profited by their schemes, not Gates. 
Gates was the real conspirator and Conway but a tool. 

The winter had now set in. After holding a council of war, 
the Commander-in-chief decided to march to Valley Forge where 
he could protect the country and watch the enemy. As the 
stone erected by this society at the side of the Bethlehem Pike 
below Fort Washington, tells us, about 700 feet south of this 
stone is an American redout and the site of Howe's threatened 
attack, Dec. 6, 1777. From here Washington's army marched 
to Valley Forge." Along this Skippack road, turning to the 
left at the Broad Axe, across Swedesford (Norristown) at Mat- 
son's Ford (Conshohocken) to Gulf Mills, thence to Valley 
Forge. As Washington said you could track the army by the 
blood from the feet of the men in the snow. 



28 

The attempt to capture Lafayette took place after the army- 
was in winter quarters at Valley Forge, but the music of the 
Meschianza reminds us that we are close to the scene. Wash- 
ington having heard that the British were about to evacuate 
Philadelphia detached Lafayette with about 2200 men and five 
guns on the 18th of May, 1778 on a reconnoissance, cautioning 
him against surprise. He marched from Valley Forge crossing 
at Swede's Ford (Norristown) to Barren Hill, and took position 
near the church about eleven miles from Philadelphia and twelve 
from Valley Forge. Secure against an attack on his front and 
right, General Potter with the militia was ordered to scout and 
guard against an attack from Philadelphia by Germantown and 
Chestnut Hill. 

Generals Howe and Clinton learning that Lafayette was thus 
isolated from the main army, thought it an opportunity to wind 
up the Meschianza and bring Lafayette back to Philadelphia 
as a prisoner of war. Apart from the glory to Howe, who was 
about to return to England, it would have been a blow to the 
French negotiations, and therefore a most important affair. Mr. 
Charlemagne Tower, quoting from the memoirs of the Marquis, 
says : "So certain were they of success that they had invited a 
party of ladies and gentlemen to meet General Lafayette at an 
entertainment the next day. Admiral Lord Howe accompanied 
his brother as a volunteer. So the morning after the Meschianza 
one division of 8,000 men with fifteen pieces of artillery under 
General Grant moved by Frankford to White Marsh, thence along 
this Skippack Pike to the Broad Axe about a mile from here, turn- 
ing to Plymouth, securing Swede's ford in the rear of the Ameri- 
can troops. 

General Potter was supposed to be on the watch at this very 
point, but for some reason never explained to this day disap- 
appeared. 

Another column with a force of cavalry marched by German- 
town along the Schuylkill on the left directly to Barren Hill, 
while a third body of men advanced forward along the Ridge 
road to attack the front. Generals Howe and Clinton accom- 



2 9 

panied this last force. Thus it was intended that Lafayette 
should be completely surrounded. But it seems from the tra- 
dition of a local historian that a certain Captain Stoy living near 
the mill below discovered the troops which the militia had failed 
to find and ran to the Broad Axe, where he called up Rudolph 
Bartleson, who continued on to Plymouth and gave the alarm. 
Some say that Stoy ran across these fields direct to Plymouth. 
Mr. Tower says that General Grant stopped at the Broad Axe for 
breakfast, affording an opportunity for the news to spread. 

There are letters from French officers on Lafayette's staff re- 
lating how Lafayette discovered Matson's Ford (Conshohocken) 
which he gained before General Grant reached it. Throwing 
forward a force to hold Grant, Lafayette withdrew his men 
across this ford to the other side of the Schuylkill. Lafayette 
says in his memoirs Generals Howe and Clinton led back their 
men to Philadelphia " very tired, very much ashamed and very 
much laughed at." Remaining all night on the South side of 
Matson's Ford, after the retreat of the British he recrossed and 
took up his former position at Barren Hill, thence across Swedes' 
Ford by the road he had come, back to Valley Forge. 

A brilliant feat but " a very near thing." 

Nothing now remains in sight save the flag contributed by this 
society to the care of the Junior Order of United American Me- 
chanics, to whom we owe our thanks, and St. Thomas's Church. 
There is no greater monument than a historic church. For 
more than two centuries St. Thomas's Church has prospered 
with a bright future still before it, unlike the pitiful tale of 
stranded churches in large cities. Philadelphia was in its earlier 
days a mere village, and all this country thickly wooded, per- 
haps desolate. 

When we say the church we do not mean the beautiful struc- 
ture consecrated in 1881 — once a church always a church. Im- 
provement and change of structure indicate progress. The or- 
iginal was but a log chapel, built in 1695, by the family of 
Major Jasper Farmer, the first settler. In 1701 this log chapel 
was destroyed by fire and the descendants of Major Farmer 



mm, 



30 

erected a substantial stone church which stood for 107 years. 
The rector of the church at Oxford, about 10 miles distant, had 
charge of both. The road on the left (right from here), was 
built to facilitate his journey between the two churches. Known 
as the Church road, it is to-day recognized as one of the best in 
the county. 

Among others the Rev. William Smith officiated until the Revo- 
lutionary War. Services were then suspended. The church hill 
was on three occasions occupied by military forces, first by the 
Americans after the battle of Germantown when Wayne brought 
the pursuing enemy to a stand, second by a body of Hessian 
cavalry, and third by the British Army under Howe. The 
church was defaced and finally almost destroyed by fire. 

The grave stones, then long flat pieces, resting on supports 
received rough treatment. Fires were lighted under them and 
some of the upright stones bear the marks of bullets. 

At the close of the war the church was a ruin and some years 
passed before services could be resumed. In 1881, while the 
Rev. Henry Ingersoll Meigs was rector, with the Sheaff family, 
who still reside near in the house of Anthony Morris, the present 
structure was completed, as the late rector, the Rev. Samuel 
Snelling, has said, a lasting monument to themselves forever. 
The present rector, the Rev. Alexander J. Miller, extends to you 
an invitation to see for yourselves that nothing has been exag- 
gerated. 

I have tried to tell you the story of Fort Washington ; but there 
is so much more to be said that I must ask you to consider very 
seriously whether you could not make a second pilgrimage to 
complete that history of which you have had a mere summary. 



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